Introduction
Most countries have a system for allocating public funds from the central (or federal) government to regional and/or local jurisdictions and for redistributing revenues from higher to lower income areas. Reallocation of financial resources among jurisdictions is not just ubiquitous but also hugely quantitatively important. For example, in the UK local authorities (LAs) receive roughly 60 percent of their funding from central government grants (the remaining funding comes from the council tax, fees and charges), making LAs highly dependent on central government decisions. Other more centralized European countries have similar reallocation schemes.
Although reallocation of higher level tax revenue to lower level jurisdictions may be comparably more important in more centralized economies, intergovernmental transfers are also hugely important in decentralized countries. For example, in the US, states' school finance equalization formulas reallocate significantly more money between school districts than the federal government spends on Medicare or on all federal income support programs combined.
If fiscal grants for a particular area increase, for reasons other than an increase in production costs or service needs (i.e., a windfall gain 1 ), a non-Leviathan local government has essentially two options. It can either increase service quality or decrease local tax rates (e.g., the council tax rate in England or the property tax rate in the United States). In both cases the area becomes more desirable and the demand for housing rises. To the extent that the supply side does not fully respond to the demand shock, the primary effect of the grant should be to increase the value of local land and the property that sits on it.
Little is known empirically about whether, under what conditions and to what extent intergovernmental transfers, and in particular central government grants, are capitalized into property prices. In this paper we shed light on these questions by exploring whether the reallocation of financial resources from the British government to LAs is capitalized into house prices. Estimating the causal effect of grants on house prices is challenging because grants are allocated through formulae that include endogeneously determined characteristics of the LA, such as age structure and ethnic composition of the population. To overcome these endogeneity issues and identify the causal effect of grants on house prices we employ an instrumental variable strategy. We utilize strategic political considerations affecting grant allocation at the national level as a source of exogenous variation in grants.
Our results based on panel data (over a period of 8 years between 2001 and 2008) and LA fixed effects as well as IV regressions suggest that an increase in the per-capita grant allocation indeed leads to higher house prices. Moreover, we find evidence on the positive dependence of the house price capitalization rate on physical constraints on housing supply (using elevation range measures). 2 Our core estimates indicate that central government grants are roughly fully capitalized into property values. In a private rental housing market without strict rent controls, a grant-induced rise in value should be passed on to tenants in the form of higher rents. Thus, in areas with less than perfectly elastic housing supply, an increase in grants may mainly benefit typically well-off property owners, absentee landlords and homeowners, while leaving private renters indifferent. This mechanism may jeopardize any redistributive aims of the grant allocation system.
Capitalization of central government grants may have a particular relevance in the light of the ongoing 'credit crunch' crisis. One consequence of this crisis is that public finances have come under enormous pressure in virtually all industrialized countries, not least in the United Kingdom. The crisis has also made it very transparent that public finances at all levels of government (national, regional and local) and housing markets are linked in complex and manifold ways. One consequence of the mounting pressure on public finances has been that governments across the globe are looking for novel and ingenious ways to raise additional revenue or cut spending to combat the growing budget deficits.
In the UK in particular, the political pressure to reduce the country's enormous public debt and deficit is very strong. At the same time, the incoming Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government has fond plans to devolve central power to the local level. All these political pressures and intended policy reforms will likely impact in a fundamental fashion on the way the central government allocates resources to LAs over the coming years. 3 These changes may well cause adjustment processes on local housing markets, which in turn may 2 We draw on earlier work by Hilber and Vermeulen (2010) who study long-term supply constraints in England. Hilber and Vermeulen find that house prices in England react more strongly to increases in household earnings in places that have tighter regulatory and physical supply constraints. 3 For instance, grants to LAs will be reduced by £1.165 billion in 2010-11 and several ring fences on spending are removed to enhance their autonomy (CLG, 2010) .
well have important distributional consequences. Our empirical findings that rely on past data imply that this is indeed likely.
Background, testable predictions and implications
The question of whether -and to what extent -local public spending and/or local taxes affect house prices has been widely studied. In a seminal paper Oates (1969) suggested that property taxes and public school spending are at least partially capitalized into house prices.
Many subsequent empirical studies, whilst using better data, enhancing the methodology and making important qualifications, have largely confirmed this finding (see e.g. the survey articles by Chaudry-Shah, 1988, and Ross and Yinger, 1999 ; see also e.g. Palmon and Smith, 1998, or Hilber and Mayer, 2009 , for more recent evidence). A much broader set of public goods, services and taxes than schools and the property tax have been found to capitalize. For instance, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) show that impact fees are fully capitalized into land values. However, the impact of central government grants -or more generally intergovernmental transfers -on property prices has received much less attention in this literature.
The theoretical framework developed in Brueckner (1979 Brueckner ( , 1982 provides a useful starting point for studying the impact of grants on house prices. In this framework, a local government finances the provision of local public services from a local property tax, with the objective of maximizing the value of its housing stock. 4 Following the conventional bid-rent approach, households (with homogeneous tastes, but heterogeneous incomes) are freely mobile between locations, so that they bid for units until the utility from dwelling there equals what they can get elsewhere. As a consequence, both the households' marginal willingness to pay for local public services and the local property tax are fully capitalized into house prices. The local government should set the level of public expenditures such that the capitalized tax needed to finance a further rise in services would just offset the capitalized willingness to pay for them. When this condition is met, public expenditure is efficient in the sense that it satisfies the Samuelson condition -at the margin, the aggregate willingness to pay for additional services equals their cost.
Within this framework, lump-sum grants would enter through the local government's budget constraint, while leaving its objective function unchanged. Hence, a local government would continue to provide public services until the capitalized tax needed to finance a further expansion would just offset the capitalized willingness to pay for it. note that additional grants that are fully passed on to households through a lower tax rate should capitalize fully irrespective of the level of public expenditure, but at the optimal level, this effect should be equal to the capitalized effect of additional public expenditure. So in particular, full capitalization may occur even if at the margin, local governments have a high propensity to spend out of central government grants − an empirical regularity that has been dubbed the flypaper effect (see e.g. Hynes and Thaler, 1995) .
Within the Brueckner framework -assuming that at the margin the propensity to spend out of grants is strictly positive -the condition that the level of spending is chosen optimally is not only sufficient but also necessary for full capitalization. 6 Suppose that for some reason spending on public services is below the level where it would maximize the value of the aggregate housing stock. This could be because of institutional constraints (e.g., property tax limits) or simply because local public policy is the outcome of a political process in which many conflicting interests interact. By implication, the capitalized willingness to pay for a raise in expenditure would exceed the capitalized tax needed to pay for it, and since a grantinduced cut in taxes would capitalize fully, a grant-induced raise in expenditure would capitalize more than fully into house prices. By a similar line of reasoning, overspending on local public services would lead to less than full capitalization. Bradbury et al. (2002) show evidence of underspending on education in a sample of Massachusetts municipalities that were constrained by Proposition 2½, a law that imposes limits on the local property tax. More specifically, they find that municipalities that managed to increase school spending (by raising property taxes -grants do not play a role in their analysis) realized gains in house prices. The authors speculate that underspending on education was not only related to institutional constraints, but also to a conflict of interests between households with and without children. In this context, Hilber and Mayer (2009) an explanation for the flypaper effect (see e.g. Filimon et al., 1982 , or Wyckoff, 1988 However, in the UK LAs have little discretionary power in altering public sector wages, corruption is commonly perceived to be quite restrained and there is little evidence of bureaucratic excesses at the local level, so we would not expect local government behavior to be aptly characterized by such bureaucratic theories.
Based on these considerations we can formulate two general, empirically testable predictions.
Prediction 1: An increase in central government grants in one LA, all else equal, should increase house values in that location.
Prediction 2:
The increase in local house values should be larger in LAs in which housing supply is more constrained.
As noted above, within the Brueckner framework, full capitalization of central government grants implies an efficient level of spending. Along this line of argumentation, Barrow and Rouse (2004) interpret their finding of full capitalization of state educational aid to local schools as evidence that on average, the level of public school provision is efficient.
However, efficiency of local public expenditure is a strong claim as it requires a number of strong assumptions. In particular, households are heterogeneous in many other respects than their income, locations are not perfect substitutes and the cost of mobility is likely positive and varies significantly between different types of households. As discussed above, this could imply either more or less than full capitalization. Hence, an empirical finding of full capitalization could just be a combination of various opposing effects. For instance, heterogeneity in tastes for education could lead to underspending from the perspective of the marginal homebuyer (implying more than full capitalization) and at the same time, some of the grants could be wasted on bureaucracy (implying less than full capitalization), so that on balance full capitalization could not be rejected empirically. Hence, one should be cautious in inferring normative claims from an empirical analysis of capitalization (see also the literature on efficiency of decentralized local governance as surveyed in Ross and Yinger, 1999) . A finding of positive capitalization merely rules out the case of a Leviathan government that wastes all grants on self-interested bureaucracy.
A finding of substantial or full capitalization also has important distributional consequences.
In particular, capitalization may jeopardize any distributional objectives that governed the allocation of grants. In this vein, Wyckoff (1995) developed a simple model (with two communities and three income groups) to demonstrate theoretically that in the case of an urban area in which the central city is not large relative to the metro area, the welfare effect of intergovernmental aid (such as education aid) on poor voters should be expected to be completely offset by higher housing cost. In the UK context, adjustments in the distribution of grants over LAs would thus boil down to redistribution of resources between property owners in gaining and losing LAs without making private renters any better off − although aid may benefit renters in the social sector to the extent that their rents are detached from market rents.
Central government grants in England
Even though the UK is regarded as a highly centralized country, local government accounts than half of the increase was made up of education spending. As pointed out in Section 2, the fact that the lion's share of grant amount increases during our sample period was spent on local schools is relevant for our empirical analysis. This is because the 'marginal homebuyer' -who determines house prices -likely values spending on primary and secondary schools more than the median voter (Hilber and Mayer, 2009 In addition to house prices and grants, the data include demographic and socio-economic variables, indicators of physical constraints to new housing construction, and the number of council seats held by each mainstream political party. The demographic and socio-economic variables are used as control variables in the regressions. They include male weekly earnings based on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) , as well as the age structure of the population, the number of secondary school pupils, the number of non-white pupils, the number of pupils eligible for free school meals and the number of unemployment benefit claimants. All latter variables are derived from the Office for National Statistics (ONS). The measure of physical housing supply constraint used in this study is the altitude range defined as the difference between the lowest and highest point in the LA. The underlying elevation raster/grid data was derived from Land-Form PANORAMA DTM. Data on council seats held by different parties was derived from the BBC website. We use this data to construct our instruments for grants. Summary statistics for all the variables appearing in the regressions are given in Table 3 .
Empirical specification
In order to test Prediction 1 that an increase in grants for a LA increases house prices, we first estimate LA fixed effects models of the log of the house price index on grants per capita and control variables. Least-squares estimation of this semi-log specification minimizes the relative deviation of predicted from observed house prices. Hence, estimates are less sensitive to outliers than in a linear model, in which the absolute deviation is minimized. The basic model can be written as
where P it is the house price index in LA i in year t, G it is total annual grants per capita received by the authority and X it denotes other LA attributes affecting house prices. LA fixed effects γ i capture unobserved LA attributes that are constant over time. We also include region-year fixed effects μ rt to control for unobserved shocks that are common for a region and LA type-year fixed effects η kt to allow for differential shocks in more and less urbanized areas.
In order to test Prediction 2 that capitalization of grants varies with physical supply constraints, we interact constraints with grants. The 'interaction model' can be written as
where C i is a measure of physical supply constraints. We use altitude range as a proxy for the ease of building new housing in the LA (see also Vermeulen, 2010, and Saiz, 2010 Estimating the effect of grants on house prices is challenging since grant allocation is based on LA attributes -such as the demographic composition -that are likely to be correlated with factors affecting house prices. Moreover, changes in the grant allocation policy may be affected by house prices or underlying determinants of house prices, which would imply that the grant policy is endogenously determined. Our first identification strategy is to estimate equations (1) and (2) by fixed effects panel regression including a flexible set of controls. In these regressions, identification is based on variation in grants within LAs over time, after controlling for region-year and LA type-year fixed effects that control for unobserved region and LA-type specific shocks affecting grants and house prices. In addition, we include LA attributes that control for endogeneity due to changes in important demographic and socioeconomic factors driving grants and possibly house prices. The LA attributes include variables that are associated with the burden of providing public services. Thus, if control variables adequately control for any increases in the burden, the coefficient on the grant variable should reflect the effect of a windfall type change in grants that is not accompanied by increases in production costs or service needs.
Even with a detailed fixed effects structure and a good set of controls, it is likely that issues related to the endogeneity of the grant policy itself remain. Moreover, the approximate apportioning of county level grants based on population and missing upper level grants for some LAs participating in joint boards leads to measurement error that can cause downward bias in the coefficient of grants. Attenuation bias due to measurement error is known to be magnified in panel data fixed effects estimation (Wooldridge, 2002) . To fully address the endogeneity concerns and the possibility of attenuation bias due to measurement error in the grant variable, we employ an instrumental variable strategy, which we discuss below.
Instrumental variable strategy
The distribution of funds to different areas through the grant system is not only driven by changes in the demand for services and the costs of producing them. It is quite likely that political considerations play an important role. We propose an instrumental variable approach that utilizes political considerations affecting grant allocation as a source of exogenous variation in grants. In the UK, the Labour party formed the national government over the period covered by the data. We argue that the Labour party may have used the grant system to allocate more money to areas where it dominates the local council by a narrow margin.
Our approach builds on a large literature on electoral targeting of government transfers, see e.g. Cox (2009) for a survey. The general idea is that these transfers, or other types of targetable benefits, are made conditional upon victory of the relevant candidate or party, so that voters are persuaded to support it. Whether transfers should be targeted at core voters,
i.e. voters with a relatively strong preference for a party (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) , or swing voters (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987) , is a major controversy within this literature. However, Cox (2009) argues that the logic of targeting swing districts is more compelling than the logic of targeting swing voters, because it can make the difference between winning and losing a seat. There is no such discrete jump in rewards to a party when it sways particular groups of voters in a single-district setting.
Several empirical studies support the idea that transfers are targeted to swing districts or regions. For instance, Wright (1974) finds that New Deal spending was higher in states in which voting in presidential elections was more volatile. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) document that the incumbent Swedish government favored regions with many swing voters in the distribution of grants from a program to support ecological sustainable development.
In the wake of this literature, we argue that Labour had an interest in securing dominance in LA councils and that it persuaded voters by implicitly conditioning grant allocation on local election outcomes. Although the distribution of seats in the national parliament does not 9 Londregan (1996, 1998) give sufficient variation in grants to identify the effect of grants on house prices. Grants presumably reward election outcomes and the adjustment of the grant formulae may take some time. Hence, we use political variables at t-2 as instruments for grants in fiscal year starting in t-1 and ending in t. A contemporaneous effect on grants may also be possible if the Labour government gets early information on shifts in Labour's support through opinion polls, for instance. We also estimated the model using instruments measured at t-1 or both t-2 and t-1 and the results were very similar.
The formation of the council cabinet is a complicated process and it is not clear which number of seats gives a party the dominance in the cabinet. Hence, the definition of the indicator for dominance as Labour having more seats than the two other main parties is somewhat arbitrary. We argue that an absolute majority (over 50 percent of seats) would probably be an overly strict condition for dominance of the council whereas being the biggest party is perhaps too loose. 11 We tested other potential definitions for Labour dominance in the first stage regression and found that our preferred Labour dominance variable based on having more seats than the two other main parties together predicts changes in grants better than alternative measures.
Labour dominance in the LA council and its interaction with Labour's share are valid instruments if they affect house prices only through their effect on grants. We argue that other potential effects of changes in Labour's dominance on prices are likely to be non-existent or miniscule relative to the effect through grants. One concern about the instruments is that the political structure of the council may lead to adjustments in local public services and council taxes, even if grants are unchanged, which could in turn capitalize into house prices.
According to Brueckner's (1979 Brueckner's ( , 1982 model discussed in Section 2, marginal adjustments in the mix of council taxes and local public services do not affect house prices if the tax service bundle is close to the level that maximizes house values. Intuitively, if taxes and services in a LA are set at a level that maximizes house values, the marginal benefit from services equals the marginal benefit of private consumption and people are indifferent between small increases in taxes and services. By contrast, a windfall type increase in grants for one LA may have a big impact on local house prices as the costs are borne by the whole country while the benefits are local. Hence, the effect of a change in grants on house prices is of a different order of magnitude than the possible effect of a change in the combination of council tax and services due to a change in the political composition of the council.
The instrumental variables strategy can lead to inconsistent estimates if changes in Labour's dominance are correlated with other factors affecting house prices that are outside the model.
We argue that controlling for the linear effect of Labour's share of seats, region-year fixed effects and authority-type-year fixed effects together capture the most important regional price determinants, such as productivity and income shocks, that may be related to Labour's dominance. With these control variables, the remaining variation in the instruments is likely to be exogenous. There is no single component of grants or type of adjustment in the grant allocation criteria through which we would expect the governing Labour party to support its local politicians. There are many ways in which the government can attempt to allocate more grants to LAs where it has marginal dominance. Firstly, the government can influence the sectoral budgets and favor sectors that are disproportionately important for LAs where its 11 Having more seats than the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats together is not equivalent with an absolute majority since minor parties have seats in many LAs.
support is strong but not uncontested. Secondly, the government can put more emphasis on allocation criteria that are important for the strategically important LAs. The government makes frequently numerous small adjustments to the formulae on which the allocation of grants is based and new Specific and Special Grants are introduced to finance various initiatives. We believe that the implications of these adjustments for LAs with different political composition are carefully examined by the government before approval when the proposal is in preparation. Indeed, anecdotic evidence is suggestive that the Labour government may have influenced the allocation in several subtle ways to channel grants strategically to LAs where the incumbent Labour county cabinet needs support. 12 All these adjustments together provide the exogenous variation in grants that the instrumental variables approach utilizes.
To the extent that the instrument reflects exogenous variation in grants, the IV-specification will estimate the effect of a windfall type change in grants that is not offset by a change in the burden of service provision due to changes in the need for services or production costs. Labour dominance got disproportionately higher grant amounts during the sample period. attributes of LAs are measured in year t-1 in order for them to better capture the LA attributes on which the allocation of grants is partly based. Earnings are measured in year t.
Results
The first column of Table 4 reports results for a specification with LA fixed effects that capture time invariant unobserved LA characteristics and year fixed effects that capture shocks that are common for the whole economy, such as interest rates. The coefficient on grants is positive but insignificant. In column (2) we include region-year fixed effects for ten regions and the coefficient rises to 0.04 and becomes significant at the ten percent level.
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Region-year fixed effects control for changes in the overall grant-levels over time in the region and other regional factors. Hence, the coefficient on grants is based on changes in grants that are higher or lower than the average increase in the region. In column (3) we add authority type-year fixed effects (three authority types 14 ) to control for the fact that more urban areas may have experienced different price shocks than less urbanized areas during the time period. The coefficient increases further to about 0.06 and becomes significant at the five percent level. In column (4) we add control variables that are likely to affect both grants and house prices. The results are roughly the same as in column (3) without controls. The coefficient of 0.06 implies that a one standard deviation increase (£490) in grants per capita leads to a 3 percent increase in local house prices.
Overall, the results in columns (1)-(4) of Table 4 suggest that grants have a positive, albeit relatively small, effect on local house prices. However, the fixed effect regression results may be biased if there are time-varying LA attributes missing from the model that affect local house prices and are correlated with changes in grants per person. The instrumental variables regressions reported in columns (5)- (7) of Table 4 address this endogeneity issue by utilizing the local election outcomes to construct instruments for grants as discussed in Section 4.2.
First stage regressions for the IV regressions in Table 4 are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix. Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table A1 correspond to columns (5), (6) and (7) of Labour's share to 50 weakens the effect to £22. The effect of Labour dominance turns negative when Labour's share reaches 67 percent.
The IV regressions in columns (5)- (7) of Table 4 give substantially higher estimates for the capitalization effect of grants than the simple FE regressions reported in columns (1)- (4). In column (5), which includes region-year fixed effects, the coefficient of grants is 0.17 and it is significant at the five percent level. In column (6) we add LA type-year fixed effects and the coefficient becomes 0.28 and is still significant at the five percent level. The inclusion of LA attributes as controls in column (7) does not seem to affect the capitalization coefficient, but the standard error increases as the instrument becomes weaker. Even after including the LA attributes the impact of grants is significant at the 10 percent level.
Supply constraints
In Table 5 we examine whether capitalization is stronger in LAs in which housing supply is constrained by physical barriers, which are proxied by altitude range. The first three columns document results for fixed effects regressions with different specifications and the last three columns show the instrumental variables estimates. The altitude range is standardized, such that the coefficient on the interaction term can be interpreted as an increase in the coefficient on grants if the altitude range increases by one standard deviation (171 meters).
In the FE regressions reported in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 , both the grant variable and its interaction with altitude range are positive and highly significant. The positive interaction term suggests that grants have a more pronounced effect on house prices when new construction is more constrained. The results are robust to changes in the specification. In all the FE regressions the coefficient on grants increases from roughly 0.08 to 0.11 when the altitude range increases by one standard deviation. Columns (4)-(6) report the IV results for the supply constraint model. Grants per capita and its interaction with the altitude range variable are instrumented with the Labour dominance indicator and its interaction with Labour's share of seats as in Table 4 and, in addition, their interactions with altitude range.
As in Table 4 , the coefficient on grants in the IV-specifications is much larger than the corresponding coefficient in the FE-specifications. The interaction term is positive and highly significant suggesting that capitalization is stronger in LAs with more constrained supply.
The relative increase in the capitalization coefficient, when the altitude range increases by one standard deviation, is roughly 20 percent. The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 12.4 and 9.3 in columns (5) and (6) respectively, in which more control variables are added to the IV specification, so there may be some small sample bias in these estimates. We also estimated the model by Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), which is a less precise but less biased alternative to the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator. The results were virtually unchanged. This suggests that there is no reason to suspect severe weak instrument bias in our estimates. Overall, the results of the supply constraint models suggest that the capitalization rate is substantially higher if construction of new housing is constrained by physical barriers.
Capitalization rate
Next we quantify the results by calculating the capitalization rates implied by the grant coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 . The capitalization rate of grants can be expressed as where β is the coefficient on grants and r is the discount rate. The term in the first parenthesis is the estimated average increase in house values when grants in an average LA go up by one unit (£1,000 per person). The second term is the present value of the one unit (£1,000) increase in grants for a dwelling with average household size. The average house value in our data is roughly £194,000 and the average household size in England was 2.4 during the sample period. We calculate the capitalization rate with three different discount rates r = 0.03, r = 0.04 and r = 0.05. Yinger et al. (1988) point out that the appropriate discount rate is the real discount rate. The average real interest rate during the period between 2000 and 2008 calculated as the average UK banks' base rate less inflation is roughly 3 percent. Adding a 1 percentage point risk premium yields r = 0.04, which we believe to be our most sensible estimate of the discount rate. Table 6 reports capitalization rates implied by the regression coefficients in Tables 4 and 5 with different assumptions on the discount rate. Panel A of Table 6 refers to the base estimates reported in Table 4 . Panel B relates to the supply constraint regressions in Table 5 and compares the capitalization rate in a LA with low altitude range (= mean -one standard deviation) with an LA with high altitude range (= mean + one standard deviation).
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In panel A of Table 6 , capitalization coefficients implied by simple fixed effect regressions vary from 0.1 to 0.25, whereas the capitalization coefficients implied by the IV regressions vary from 0.4 to slightly above full capitalization. The IV estimates in columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 are our preferred estimates for the price effect of grants. Using these estimates for β and the discount rate of four percent -our most sensible guess -yields a capitalization coefficient of roughly 0.9 suggesting that grants are almost fully capitalized. It should be noted that the capitalization rate is based on the assumption that the increase in grants is permanent. If there is uncertainty about whether the grant increase is permanent, the present value of the grant increase in equation (3) will be too high and the capitalization rate is underestimated. Hence the capitalization rate of 0.9 may well be an underestimate for the capitalization rate of a permanent grant increase. Overall, the point estimates suggest that grants may be roughly fully capitalized into house prices. The finding of nearly full capitalization is, however, not entirely conclusive as the confidence intervals for the coefficient on grants are quite broad.
Panel B of Table 6 reports capitalization rates implied by the supply constraint regressions.
We have selected the fixed effects estimates in column (3) and the IV estimates in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 
Conclusions
Central government grants in the UK are allocated in such a way that LAs are compensated for fiscal burdens associated with unfavorable demographic and socioeconomic population compositions. However, our identification strategy unveils that this allocation has also been influenced by strategic political considerations, as the Labour party targeted grants to areas where it gained marginal dominance after local elections. This source of exogenous variation in grants represents a windfall type of grant, and our empirical findings suggest that increases in this windfall type of grant are roughly fully capitalized into house prices. Furthermore, the impact of grants on house prices appears to be stronger in locations in which new construction is constrained by physical barriers. One implication of our findings is that local governments appear to use grants in ways that are valued by the marginal homebuyer. There is little evidence to suggest that LAs spend their financial resources largely on self-interested bureaucracy.
The May 2010 elections in the UK generated a very significant political change. The new coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (which replaced the outgoing Labour government that was in power for 13 years) is likely to enact major policy changes that will lead to a significant reallocation of resources from the central government to LAs.
Moreover, the political swing will likely lead to a reallocation of resources across LAs. This reallocation of resources represents a windfall type grant independent of whether the new grant system is closer to the ideal of compensating for local burden or not. Our findings imply that the changes at the local level will likely be capitalized into property prices.
What are the policy implications of these changes? Property owners (homeowners and absentee landlords) will either significantly gain or lose, depending on whether they live in LAs that observe relative increases or decreases in grants. In contrast, assuming that windfall type grants increase rents as well as house prices, private renters should largely be unaffected by the changes (greater desirability is compensated by higher rents and vice versa). 17 In other 17 Whether social renters are also subject to redistribution depends on whether social rents reflect changes in the desirability of a LA or not. The weaker the inter-temporal correlation of social rents and private rents, the more affected social renters will be by the 'redistribution lottery'.
words, the grant system and changes in the allocation of grants generate substantial redistribution among property owners in different parts of the country, leaving (private) renters unaffected.
More generally, our findings imply that the British grant system has very substantial unintended consequences in that it generates massive redistribution of resources without helping the most disadvantaged individuals as well as the less fortunate in the most disadvantaged places. To illustrate this argument, consider for example an increase in the "Guns, Gangs and Knives" grant intended to help people living in disadvantaged areas / the inner city poor. Our findings imply that the possible crime prevention effects or lower taxes would increase house prices and rents in inner cities, which are largely populated by renters.
Beneficiaries of the change are (the few) homeowners as well as landlords who own most of the inner city properties. Private renters would likely not benefit from the additional funding because they pay via higher rents for the benefits of the grant increase. Social renters may benefit to the extent that the grant increase does not affect their rents.
One policy implication of our findings is that it may be more effective and efficient to "help people rather than places". In addition to the fact that the grant system has substantial unintended distributional consequences, these grants are financed at the national level, mainly with income taxes, which in turn are associated with significant deadweight losses. Our results suggest that lower income tax rates, less grant-induced redistribution but more direct help to disadvantaged people could achieve the same distributional outcome at potentially significantly lower cost. Such a reform could contribute towards lessening the fiscal pressures that have been mounting during the ongoing economic / public finance crisis. 
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